This article shows that these are not stand-alone developments, but developments that fit within an evolutionary chain towards increasing transparency requirements for investors. Using a unique dataset comprising data from 25 countries over 11 years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) and collected by the Centre for Business Research (CBR) of the University of Cambridge, we empirically study the evolution of ownership disclosure rules across countries. The analysis demonstrates that ownership disclosure rules have become more stringent over time, and we argue that transparency requirements for investors are likely to continue to increase in the future.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section B briefly describes the benefits of ownership disclosure rules. Accordingly, this Section discusses the various mechanisms through which ownership disclosure can fulfil two main functions: improving corporate governance and improving market efficiency. We draw from these insights later in the article, when we offer possible explanations for the results of our analysis.
Section C describes the dataset and explains the methodology used for coding ownership disclosure rules. Using descriptive statistics and tests of differences between means, this Section subsequently shows how countries' ownership disclosure rules have evolved over time. Our main finding is that ownership disclosure rules have become more stringent over time, in the sense that disclosure thresholds have, on average, been lowered. We also examine whether differences between certain types of countries can explain the variations that we observe. The data indicates that developed countries have, on average, had more stringent ownership disclosure rules, but developing countries are catching up. By 2005, there was a strong convergence towards a 5% threshold for disclosure.
Section D explores the relationship between ownership disclosure rules and other features of the corporate governance landscape. We observe a large positive correlation between the variable the Irish takeover rules to include cash-settled equity derivatives); Dutch Ministry of Finance, ( proposing that investors be required to disclose whether or not they agree with the company's strategy when they disclose the acquisition of a substantial interest).
Wijziging van de Wet op het financieel toezicht, de Wet giraal effectenverkeer en het Burgerlijk Wetboek naar aanleiding van het advies van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code van 30 mei 2007 (2009)
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European FP6 -Integrated Project Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law -Université Catholique de Louvain -http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be WP-CG-41 for ownership disclosure and other variables that protect minority shareholders against controlling shareholders. The data also indicates that the stringency of countries' ownership disclosure rules is positively correlated to the degree of dispersed ownership. We offer several possible explanations for these results.
Section E discusses the future of ownership disclosure rules. While there are signs that there may be convergence towards a 3% threshold, it appears unlikely that there will be many countries adopting an even lower threshold. However, we can expect ownership disclosure rules to continue to evolve in other dimensions. As the UK and EC examples illustrate, regulators may amend their ownership disclosure rules in two ways. First, they may broaden the definition of the stake that triggers disclosure, so as to ensure that the ultimate owner is reached. Second, they may require that more information be disclosed when the notification is made, so as to enable other investors and issuers to adequately assess the implications of major share ownership. Section F concludes.
THE FUNCTION OF OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE RULES
The basis for our analysis is the CBR shareholder protection index, which traces the development of legal rules over time. 5 This index includes several variables that are proxies for protection of shareholders against the board, such as a variable for director independence. Since in countries characterised by concentrated ownership the protection of minority shareholders against dominant shareholders is a key concern, the index also includes several variables that are proxies for protection against dominant shareholders. 5 See supra Section A and infra Section C and Appendix. 6 This risk of minority shareholder abuse by blockholders is exacerbated when blockholders have not only significant informal power over the board but also significant formal power, as is the case in many Continental European countries, especially when compared to the US. One of the variables that are proxies for protection against dominant shareholders relates to ownership disclosure. 7 The motivation to include this variable in the index was that ownership disclosure rules "tell us something about how shareholders are protected in the event of a change of corporate control". 8 For the purposes of this article, it is useful to discuss the function of ownership disclosure rules in more detail. In doing so, we draw on an earlier article by one of us, which distinguishes two main functions of ownership disclosure: improving market efficiency and improving corporate governance.
9
Market Efficiency
Ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency through various mechanisms. At the time of a public offering, disclosure of the identity of large shareholders, and the number of voting rights they hold, enables investors to anticipate agency costs. Consider the presence of a controlling shareholder, for instance the founder. In some cases, such presence may signal an increase in agency costs due to a heightened risk of private benefit extraction. One way to extract private benefits is through tunnelling, as illustrated by the case of Italian dairy producer Parmalat. 10 In other cases, the presence of a controlling shareholder may signal a decrease in agency costs, because of active monitoring of management. By requiring issuers to disclose their ownership 7 Two other empirical studies include variables for ownership disclosure in their indices. The first is a measure of investor protection through securities laws: R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes and A Shleifer, "What Works in Securities Laws?" (2006) Once the shares are floating, disclosure of the entry or exit of large shareholders enables investors to continue to anticipate agency costs. The appearance of an activist hedge fund, for example, may signal an increase in monitoring. By requiring shareholders to disclose major acquisitions, again, investors are enabled to make an informed estimate of the implications for the value of the share -this is one of the objectives of the US disclosure regime. 12 Indeed, we often see share prices responding positively to the news that an activist hedge fund has acquired a stake.
13
Ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency through several other mechanisms, namely by creating transparency of economic interests of major shareholders, of trading interest and of the size of the free float. We do not discuss these mechanisms here in detail. 14 The bottom line is that by promoting share price accuracy, ownership disclosure can contribute to market efficiency, and thus ultimately to an efficient allocation of resources in the economy.
15 11 The importance of ownership disclosure for these purposes has recently been underlined by a high profile case in which Goldman Sachs and ABN AMRO were found liable in connection with the IPO of an internet company in 2000, because the prospectus failed to adequately disclose the particulars of a reduction of the CEO's ownership stake prior to the IPO. Dutch Supreme Court, 27 November 2009, LJN BH2162 (in this particular case, the court considered that the relevance of the information derived not from agency considerations but from the fact that the transaction conveyed information about the CEO's valuation of the company. This is what is referred to later in this section as ownership disclosure's function of providing information on trading interest). 12 Schouten, supra n 9, at 10. 13 
Corporate Governance
Transparency of major shareholdings not only enables anticipation of agency costs, but can also play an active role in reducing such costs -thereby improving corporate governance. There are two mechanisms through which ownership disclosure can do this.
First, ownership disclosure can enable enforcement. In firms with concentrated ownership, disclosure of major shareholdings may expose a potential for trading on inside information or other forms of market abuse. More importantly, disclosure of the identity of the person who ultimately controls the firm makes it easier to detect diversion of corporate assets, for instance by exposing opportunities for tunnelling. 16 Transparency may also prevent blockholders from engaging in abusive behaviour in the first place, consistent with the notion that sunlight is the best disinfectant.
17
In firms with dispersed ownership, ownership disclosure may facilitate the market for corporate control, the mechanism through which management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat of takeovers. Transparency of the target's ownership structure helps bidders to estimate the likelihood that their bid will succeed, and to identify parties who could be approached for irrevocable undertakings. Ownership disclosure also enables other potential bidders to mount a competing offer, by alerting them that a third party is building a stake in the target.
On the other hand, ownership disclosure may negatively affect the market for corporate control. Mandatory disclosure of stakebuilding can discourage the initial bidder from making a bid in the first place, because his potential profits are reduced. Moreover, it functions as an early warning system to management of the target. This was originally one of the purposes of the UK 
Dataset and methodology
The CBR Index contains data for 25 countries over 11 years (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . The data on ownership disclosure rules thus consists of 275 observations. Explanations and references to the relevant provisions of law are available online.
25
Earlier articles describe the coding methodology of the CBR Index in detail. 26 Here, we limit ourselves to describing the variable that codes the rules on ownership disclosure. It is defined as follows: 29 The result is that 19 out of the 20 countries, which are covered by both of the indices, get an optimal score (Table 1) . By contrast, the CBR Index uses thresholds that are better able to capture the differences between the stringency of ownership disclosure rules across countries. 29 We also believe that for our purposes, the definition we use is also preferable to the one used in La Porta et al's anti-self-dealing index. While this index consists of three sub-variables relating to disclosure of ownership in the issuer, these only refer to periodic disclosure obligations by the issuer, not ad hoc disclosure by the relevant shareholder. Djankov et al, supra n 7, 434. 30 In fairness, the variable used in La Porta et al's investor protection index does address the issue of whether indirect share ownership also triggers a disclosure obligation, whereas the variable used in the CBR Index does not. However, as will be argued below, La Porta et al's variable is insufficiently specific to capture relevant differences between countries in this respect (see infra n 93 and accompanying text). 31 Sources: CBR Index, supra n 25; La Porta et al, supra n 7, 6 (data available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/securities_data1.xls).
30
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General Results
The CBR Index not only reports the coded variables 32 but also the actual minimum thresholds at which share ownership has to be disclosed. 33 This is summarised in Table 2 Mexico also requires ownership disclosure. 34 Overall, we therefore observe a strengthening of disclosure obligations. This overall strengthening is also apparent from Table 3 , which presents the results in a format that reflects our methodology for coding ownership rules. For the first row of Table 3 , we have computed the mean score for the entire sample. The second row shows the standard deviation, which gives a sense of the extent to which scores of individual countries in the sample tend to vary from the mean score for the entire sample. In 1995, the mean score was 0.56, and by 2005 it was 0.68. Recall that a score of 0.5 is given if a country's disclosure threshold is set at 10%, and of 0.75 if it is set at 5%. On average, ownership disclosure rules thus became more stringent between 1995 and 2005. 35 The standard deviation generally is fairly low, because the majority of the countries had a disclosure threshold of 5% for the entire sample period. If we look at the development of the standard deviation over time, we see that in 1995, it was 0.34, and that by 2005 it had decreased to 0.21. This suggests that there has been a convergence of ownership disclosure rules. namely the remarkable relaxation of ownership disclosure rules in Russia, where the disclosure threshold was increased from 5% to 25% (see Table 2 ).
37 35 Regressing mean on year and a constant term produces the result that the mean is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value 4.423). 36 Regressing standard deviation on year and a constant term produces the result that the standard deviation is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value -4.81). 37 The Russian Securities Law introduced in 1996 set the initial disclosure at 25%, which rule remained in force until 2006. However, the rules adopted by the Federal Commission on Stock Markets in 1998 required disclosure upon acquisition of a 5% stake in certain major companies (this change is reflected in our data). Apparently, there was uncertainty as to whether the Federal Commission had the authority to impose more 
Results for Different Groups of Countries
We now break down the results to obtain a more granular picture of how ownership disclosure rules have evolved over time. Specifically, we are interested in the question of whether ownership disclosure rules have evolved differently in countries that belong to the same group (such as developed countries, EU countries or common law countries) than in other countries.
Differences between developed and developing countries Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). Table 4 contrasts the evolution of ownership disclosure rules in these developed countries against the 12 other countries in our sample. +0.06 -0.11 +0.13 -0.08 -0.08* Tests of differences: *, **, and *** indicate whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level stringent requirements than stipulated by the Securities Law, which may explain why, in 2003, the stock exchange rules were amended so that the threshold was 25%, consistent with the Securities Law (this change is also reflected in our data Table 4 shows that on average, developed countries have had more stringent ownership disclosure rules. The results are statistically significant. Notably, the difference between the two groups of countries decreased over time, as developing countries gradually lowered their disclosure thresholds towards 5%, the level at which most developed countries had their thresholds set throughout the entire sample period. 39 This finding is consistent with Armour et al.'s finding of "a degree of overall convergence in the legal protection of shareholders", based on time series
analysis of the development of shareholder protection as proxied by all 10 variables of the CBR Index.
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Differences between EU and non-EU countries
It is also interesting to see whether countries that form part of the EU display stronger convergence of ownership disclosure rules than the other countries in the sample. Table 5 contrasts the evolution of ownership disclosure rules in the 10 current EU Member States in our sample against the 15 other countries in the sample. 39 The decreasing difference between the two groups of countries can be seen from Table 4 , which shows that in 1995, the difference between the means was 0.26, and that by 2005, the difference between the means had reduced to 0.17. Again, the results are skewed by one outlier, Russia, which increased the threshold from 5% to 25% in 2003. See supra n 37. Disregarding Russia, the difference between the means would be even smaller. 40 +0.15 -0.22 +0.10 -0.10 -0.01 Tests of differences: *, **, and *** indicate whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level
The decrease in standard deviation for EU Member States (-0.22) is considerably sharper than the decrease in standard deviation for non-EU Member States (-0.10). This confirms that countries forming part of the EU display stronger convergence of ownership disclosure during the sample period than the other countries in the sample. Does this mean that changes in the ownership disclosure rules of EU Member States during the sample period were not exogenous, but merely reflected prevailing EU standards? Not necessarily.
The 1988 Large Holdings Directive required EU Member States to set the disclosure threshold at 10%, while allowing Member States to set the threshold even lower (the Directive aimed at minimum harmonisation). 41 Table 5 shows that the mean score for EU Member States was 0.73.
Coupled with the low standard deviation (0.14), this suggests that most EU Member States had their disclosure threshold set at 5% for most of the sample period. This can also be seen from theory proposed by La Porta et al. predicts they would. 43 A major problem of the common law/civil law divide is that in reality, most legal systems are hybrids. For instance, South African law derives from both civil law and common law traditions; Japanese company law used to be based on the German model, but since the 1950s has been heavily influenced by US law; Swiss company law is influenced by UK company law and, due to the influence of the EU, UK law itself has become more "continental". 44 Therefore, more precise, but related, criteria need to be used than the mere distinction between common law and civil law countries. The most obvious one is "language", because most English-speaking countries are common law countries.
45 Table 6 shows the evolution of ownership disclosure rules for countries that have English as at least one of its official languages (Canada, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, UK, US) and the rest of the world. The better protection of both shareholders and creditors in common law countries than especially in the French civil law ones is consistent with the principal historical narrative of the greater security of private property and better contract enforcement under common law"). With respect to disclosure obligations, albeit of a different nature (see supra n 16 and 29) see Djankov et al, supra n 7, 440-441 (finding that the listed buyer in their hypothetical conflicted transaction is required to make full expost disclosure (including with respect to share ownership) in periodic filings in 43% of common law countries, but only in 12% of civil law countries) and La Porta et al, supra n 7, 14-16 (finding that common law countries have more extensive mandatory disclosure requirements for the prospectus, including with respect to share ownership -0.12 -0.07 Tests of differences: *, **, and *** indicate whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level Table 6 shows that on average, English-speaking countries have slightly more stringent ownership disclosure rules. But this was not consistently the case throughout the sample period, and over time the difference between the two groups appears to have become smaller. Be this as it may, the results are not statistically significant. This suggests that the common law/civil law divide is not helpful in explaining differences between countries' ownership disclosure rules.
Conclusion
This Section has used the CBR shareholder protection index in order to show how ownership disclosure rules have evolved over time. The general trend is that countries have lowered the threshold that triggers ownership disclosure. The results indicate that developed and EU countries provide stricter rules on ownership disclosure than the others countries of our sample. The results also indicate that by 2005, the end of the sample period, there was strong convergence towards the 5% level for initial ownership disclosure.
OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE RULES IN CONTEXT
In this Part, we place the data in context by exploring the relationship between ownership disclosure rules and other features of the corporate governance landscape. Thus, we examine the relationship between ownership disclosure rules and other measures of shareholder protection. We also analyse the relationship between ownership disclosure rules and other legal and economic variables, such as ownership concentration.
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Relation to Other Measures of Shareholder Protection
To explore the relationship between ownership disclosure rules and other measures of shareholder protection, we have computed the correlation between the variable for ownership disclosure and the other variables included in the CBR Index for 1995 and 2005. The coding for these variables is explained in the Appendix. Table 7 presents the results. One could imagine that different countries prefer different forms of shareholder protection.
Thus, these different forms could be substitutes and one would expect a negative correlation coefficient. However, Table 7 shows the opposite result: the law on ownership disclosure is mostly positively related to each of the other forms of shareholder protection (shaded fields). Thus, we find that across countries, different ways of protecting shareholders generally complement each other.
Further, notice the relatively large correlation between the variables for ownership disclosure and mandatory bid. Possibly, this correlation is due to the fact that ownership disclosure, to some extent, supports enforcement of the mandatory bid by exposing stakebuilding. 46 More generally, 46 This is true not only for the initial disclosure obligation but also for subsequent disclosure obligations. If, for example, the trigger for the mandatory bid is set at 30% of the voting rights, it makes sense to require disclosure upon crossing the 30% threshold. This does not necessarily mean, however, that both obligations are triggered under the exact same circumstances. In the EU, for example, the mandatory bid forms part of the takeover rules (contained in the Takeover Directive) while the disclosure obligation forms part of the one could argue that what ownership disclosure rules and the mandatory bid rule have in common is that they both provide a certain degree of protection for minority shareholders against large shareholders. 47 This is also a feature of the variable 'Shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting', which is also strongly correlated with ownership disclosure.
Relation to Other Legal and Economic Variables
This section turns to the relationship between the stringency of ownership disclosure rules and other legal and economic variables. It is difficult to establish whether there is a causal link between the legal rules on ownership disclosure, ownership structure and economic development, since there are likely to be mutual interdependencies between these three factors. 48 Therefore, we do not use regression analyses to test for causality. Instead, we focus on correlations between legal and economic variables. Table 8 shows the descriptive data on the relevant variables, and Table 9 presents the correlation between these variables and ownership disclosure rules.
rules concerning issuer disclosure requirements (contained in the Transparency Directive). Each provision has its own definition of "acting in concert", so the relevant provisions need not be triggered simultaneously. 47 Indeed, it is because of this feature that both were included as a variable in the CBR Index; see text accompanying n 5-8. 48 For the problem of endogeneity in law and finance research, see also Armour et al, supra n 40, 346-7, 368-9, 375-6. Interpretation of correlation with ownership structure
Ownership disclosure can be a useful means to protect minority shareholders against controlling shareholders, 57 which is why we might expect ownership disclosure rules to be more stringent in countries with concentrated ownership than in countries with dispersed ownership. Indeed, a previous study using the CBR dataset found that in general, minority shareholder protection is stronger in countries with concentrated ownership than in countries with dispersed ownership.
58
Interestingly, though, Table 9 shows a positive correlation between countries' degree of dispersed ownership and the stringency of their ownership disclosure rules. This suggests that ownership disclosure rules are not more stringent in countries with concentrated ownership than in countries with dispersed ownership.
59
One explanation could follow from the law and finance literature: ownership disclosure rules protect shareholders (and these rules are also positively correlated with other forms of shareholder protection 60 ). Thus, in countries with better shareholder protection, more people may invest in 55 In order to address potential outliers we have also calculated the correlation coefficient between the rules on ownership disclosure and the log transformation of variables of Table 8 . However, the results are almost identical to the ones of companies, which subsequently may lead to more dispersed share ownership. 61 The evidence does not provide unanimous support for this theory, however, since it has not been found that the CBR Index matters for financial development. 62 It is therefore also worth considering the alternative causality story, namely that lawmakers react to particular ownership structures of firms.
One possibility, then, would be that the relative stringency of ownership disclosure rules in countries with dispersed share ownership could be explained by the fact that in addition to protecting minority shareholders, ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency. 63 Countries with dispersed ownership may be particularly concerned with improving market efficiency through stringent ownership disclosure rules, because on average, firms depend more on outside equity and market efficiency ultimately reduces the cost of capital. 64 Indeed, the recent suggestion by Mary Schapiro, chair of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), that US ownership disclosure rules may need to be tightened in order to create more transparency on equity derivatives, appears to have been based in large part on concerns about fair and orderly markets and capital formation.
65
Another possibility is that the higher level of ownership disclosure in dispersed ownership countries can be explained by public choice theory. Interpretation of correlation with other variables Table 9 shows that there is hardly any correlation between the variable for ownership disclosure See also Djankov et al, supra n 7, 448 (finding that their variable on ex post private control of self-dealing (which includes sub-variables relating to ownership disclosure in periodic filings) is positively correlated to a variable for stock market capitalisation to GDP) and La Porta et al, supra n 7, 17, 19 (finding that their disclosure requirements index (which includes a variable for share ownership disclosure in the prospectus) is positively correlated to a variable for stock market capitalisation to GDP).
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European FP6 -Integrated Project Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law -Université Catholique de Louvain -http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.be WP-CG-41 levels of investor protection (as proxied, inter alia, by ownership disclosure rules) on the books, the development of their financial market is constrained by the absence of effective legal institutions. 74 The fact that ownership disclosure rules are not always vigorously enforced is illustrated by an empirical study of corporate governance in Central and Eastern European countries: even as most of these countries had set their threshold for disclosure at 5% by 2002, the identity of the ultimate owner was still undisclosed due in part to the laxity in enforcement of disclosure.
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Consistent with these studies, Table 9 indicates that there is no positive correlation between the variable for ownership disclosure and the variable for enforcement of securities law. On this basis, one might conclude that countries that have relatively stringent ownership disclosure rules need not also have relatively intense enforcement. Our results do not provide unanimous support for this conclusion, however, because Table 9 also reveals a positive correlation between the stringency of countries' ownership disclosure rules and the rule of law. Given that there is a strong correlation between countries' rule of law and their level of development 76 , this particular finding is consistent with our earlier finding that developed countries, on average, have more stringent ownership disclosure rules.
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Conclusion
The law on ownership disclosure is positively related to other measures of shareholder protection.
In particular, we observe a strong positive relationship between ownership disclosure rules and 74 Pistor et al, supra n 42, 356 (the authors use three variables to measure the effectiveness of legal institutions in transition economies: "(1) a rule of law rating provided by outside expert assessment; (2) an index of the effectiveness of corporate and bankruptcy law in transition economies constructed by the EBRD; and (3) survey data on the ability of the legal system to protect private property rights and enforce contracts" variables that protect minority shareholders against large shareholders. Perhaps, surprisingly, there is also a positive relationship between the rules on ownership disclosure and widely held ownership. This could be interpreted as a confirmation of the law and finance literature, but not necessarily so. After all, politics or other factors could also explain why countries with dispersed shareholder ownership are more likely to provide strict rules on ownership disclosure. Indeed, nonquantitative research shows that various factors contribute to the dispersion of shareholder ownership, with shareholder protection playing a minor role.
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Finally, our results indicate that there is hardly any correlation between the variable for ownership disclosure and the variable for stock market capitalisation. The two might be unrelated, as previous studies using the CBR dataset suggest. By contrast, if we were to assume that ownership disclosure rules do have a positive impact on stock market capitalisation, one possible explanation for why our data does not show a positive correlation between the two variables is that in order for ownership disclosure rules to have such impact, they need to be vigorously enforced. Markets Expert Group has stated that "[i]mportant financial markets are converging to 3%", and that "it is important that the others (…) follow as soon as possible".
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Yet, while we may witness convergence toward the 3% level in the future, it appears unlikely that there will be many countries setting their disclosure threshold at an even lower level. A threshold of, say, 1%, may tip the scale and cause the benefits of disclosure to be exceeded by the costs (such as compliance costs and reduced incentives to search for information on the fundamental value of firms). 83 Indeed, more shareholder protection need not necessarily be better. 84 Ideally, the evolution of ownership disclosure rules ends not at a point where a
"maximum" but an "optimum" has been found.
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It can be expected, though, that beyond this point, the evolution of ownership disclosure rules will continue in other dimensions. As will be explained below, besides the height of the disclosure threshold, there are two other aspects of ownership disclosure rules that particularly affect their stringency: the definition of the stake that triggers disclosure and the scope of the actual disclosure obligation.
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The Definition of the Stake that Triggers Disclosure
In its most straightforward form, a disclosure obligation is triggered upon acquiring a certain number of voting rights attached to shares. But as ownership disclosure rules become more sophisticated, the disclosure obligation will no longer be triggered only as the result of holding voting rights. Rather, it will be triggered as the result of obtaining access to voting rights, whether directly or indirectly. This is key to ensuring that the ultimate owner (i.e. the beneficial owner) can be identified. Indeed, in the absence of ownership disclosure rules with a sufficiently broad definition of the stake that triggers disclosure, it can be quite challenging to identify the ultimate owner. This could be an explanation for why a 1997 study on transparency of ownership structures of EU listed firms found that "[t]he disclosed identity of the agent who has ultimate control over a significant voting block is not entirely reliable in any of the Member States that were surveyed." 87 An example of an expanded definition is when a disclosure obligation is also triggered as a consequence of "acting in concert" with others who hold voting rights. The ambiguity of the term "acting in concert", and the resulting controversies, serve as a powerful reminder that while it is important to have a definition that is sufficiently broad, it is also key to avoid a definition that is overly broad. Otherwise, ownership disclosure rules risk stiffening communication between shareholders whose aim is merely to coordinate their monitoring efforts, not to gain control over the firm. 88 The same applies to mandatory bid rules, which typically can also be triggered by acting in concert.
Another example of an expanded definition is when a disclosure obligation is also triggered upon acquisition of equity derivatives that grant a right to acquire voting rights, such as physically settled options. 89 As mentioned in the Introduction, the FSA has recently taken this one step further. Under UK rules, a disclosure obligation is now also triggered upon acquisition of cashsettled equity derivatives such as contracts for difference (Cfd), merely because these imply the possibility of obtaining access to voting rights. 90 10%) . The reason for ESME to recommend separate disclosure, contrary to the UK where physically settled equity derivatives, cash-settled equity derivatives and shares should be aggregated, is related to the fact that present differences in implementation of the Directive lead to administrative costs for asset management companies operating on a cross-border scale. In order not to get caught in these complexities, ESME is pleading for a reporting obligation that is general and harmonised at EU level and therefore separate from reporting of normal shares). 93 La Porta et al, supra n 7, 6. The full definition reads as follows: "An index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer's equity ownership structure. of one-half (and the vast majority are attributed a score of one). 94 It also becomes clear from the CBR dataset. Although only information on threshold percentages was requested, most country reporters have provided additional information on the relevant ownership disclosure rules. In nearly every instance where they have done so, the information refers to "direct or indirect" ownership or to the "beneficial owner". 95 The real question, therefore, is not whether ownership disclosure rules are also triggered by indirect ownership, but how effective these rules are at identifying the ultimate owner. The challenge for future empirical studies will be to define a variable that adequately measures this.
The Scope of the Actual Disclosure Obligation
The other major aspect of ownership disclosure rules that affects their stringency concerns the scope of the actual disclosure obligation. This refers to the amount of information that needs to be disclosed once the disclosure obligation is triggered and the notification needs to be made. The two primary disclosure items are the identity of the acquirer and the number of voting rights acquired, typically expressed as a percentage of the total number of voting rights. Some countries, however, also require disclosure of, for example, the number of shares held, 96 the purpose of acquisition, 97 or related financial arrangements. 98 Here too, concerns over hedge fund activism seem to be driving regulators towards expanding the scope of the actual disclosure obligation.
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The way in which countries can be expected to expand the scope of the actual disclosure obligation will depend on the specific functions of ownership disclosure they wish to reinforce.
Suppose that a given country has a large population of firms that deviate from one share-one vote. 94 See Table 1 and, for the countries not listed in Table, If the regulator in that country is concerned with reinforcing the function of promoting market efficiency though accurate share prices, 100 it may make sense to require that shareholders disclose, in addition to the number of voting rights held, the number and class of shares held. This way, the market is enabled to more accurately assess the incentives of the relevant blockholder, the likely agency costs deriving from the ownership structure and hence the implications for the value of the share. 103 Accordingly, expanded disclosure requirements would not only reinforce the mechanism through which ownership disclosure improves market efficiency, but also the mechanism through which ownership disclosure improves corporate governance; see Schouten, supra n 9, 50-1. This is the reason for which the Dutch government has recently proposed to require blockholders to also disclose gross short positions. shareholders is to enable issuers to identify such shareholders by granting them a statutory right to request extensive information from anyone the issuer believes to be interested in its shares, as it exists in the UK. 107 The fact that issuers are keen on taking measures to obtain such information is also illustrated by the fact that in the US, many issuers have amended their bylaws calling for proxy contest proponents to include extensive information such as on whether and to what extent equity and voting interests are decoupled. 108 As a final example, regulators concerned with reinforcing the function of promoting corporate governance by enabling monitoring of controlling shareholders' behaviour may require such shareholders to disclose additional information. This is illustrated by the European Commission's proposal for a directive on alternative investment fund managers, referred to in the Introduction.
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While it remains to be seen whether the proposal will be adopted, the opposition thus far has focused primarily on key issues such as restrictions on leverage and compensation. 110 It may therefore well be that the proposed disclosure rules will be adopted, and that fund managers will be obliged to disclose, for example, a policy for preventing and managing conflicts of interests.
We do not suggest that the benefits of these examples of expanded ownership disclosure rules outweigh the costs. 111 Rather, our point is that even though disclosure thresholds are unlikely to be lowered significantly in the future, as long as financial innovation and market practices continue to undermine transparency of major share ownership, we can expect ownership disclosure rules to evolve. This evolution is likely to take place along the lines set out in this section.
CONCLUSION
Ownership disclosure rules across countries have become more stringent between 1995 and 2005.
A breakdown of the results suggests that the degree of countries' economic development is a relevant factor in explaining the differences between countries: developed countries tend to have more stringent ownership disclosure rules than transition and developing countries. The differences have become smaller over time, though, as most countries had settled for a 5% threshold for ownership disclosure by the end of the sample period. Convergence has also taken place within the European Union, where, interestingly, Member States have consistently set lower thresholds for disclosure than required by the European minimum rules in force during the sample period.
Furthermore, we have observed a large positive correlation between the variable for ownership disclosure and other variables that protect minority shareholders against controlling shareholders.
The data also indicates that the stringency of countries' ownership disclosure rules is positively correlated to the degree of dispersed ownership. We have advanced two possible explanations for this. The first is that countries with dispersed ownership care more about ownership disclosure because such rules contribute to the efficiency of capital markets and thus lower the cost of outside equity. The second is based on public choice theory, and posits that in countries with dispersed 111 For a discussion of the costs of ownership disclosure, see Schouten, supra n 9. ownership, incumbent management lobbies for stringent ownership disclosure rules because such rules can shield management from hostile takeover attempts by alerting them of stakebuilding.
While our data indicates that there was convergence around the 5% level for initial disclosure by 2005, more recent developments suggest that in the future, countries' ownership disclosure rules may converge around the 3% level. It appears likely that beyond that point, the evolution of ownership disclosure rules will shift entirely to other aspects affecting their stringency. In particular, we can expect regulators to respond to financial innovation by expanding the definition of the stake that triggers disclosure, so as to ensure that the ultimate owner can be identified.
Regulators may also require that more information be disclosed when the notification is made, so as to enable other investors and issuers to adequately assess the implications of major share ownership. Accordingly, future empirical research of ownership disclosure rules will have to focus not only on the threshold for disclosure, but also on these two dimensions of ownership disclosure rules affecting their stringency.
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